Le Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative (CIREQ) regroupe des chercheurs dans les domaines de l'économétrie, la théorie de la décision, la macroéconomie et les marchés financiers, la microéconomie appliquée et l'économie expérimentale ainsi que l'économie de l'environnement et des ressources naturelles. We give a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a nonrenewable resource asymmetric game. We show that (i) there almost always exists a phase where both supply simultaneously positive quantities, (ii) when the high cost mine is exploited by a number of …rms that goes to in…nity the equilibrium approaches the cartel-versus-fringe equilibrium with the fringe …rms acting as price takers, (iii) the cheaper resource may not be exhausted …rst.
Introduction
Although there exists an established and very large literature addressing the problem of exploitation of a nonrenewable resource such as oil, there is still no complete treatment of the case where several agents interact at the market level, each owning a stock of the resource. Probably the reason is the technical complexity of treating such a problem in a general formulation. To make progress, this question has been addressed under di¤erent assumptions. The assumptions typically specify the type of competition prevailing, the type of information and commitment possibilities, the market conditions and …rms' characteristics. In this paper we characterize the extraction equilibrium for a larger set of cases than has been treated in the literature so far (a more speci…c description follows).
Interest in nonrenewable resource has been at least partly driven by the importance of the oil market worldwide. Salant (1976) and later Ulph and Folie (1980) model the oil market as a market with one coherent cartel and a fringe, consisting of many identical small oil suppliers acting as price takers. Lewis and Schmalensee (1980) and Loury (1986) justify the assumption of price taking behavior of the fringe and show that when the number of fringe members becomes arbitrarily large, the equilibrium converges to the equilibrium obtained under price taking behavior assumption. In these papers the cartel and the fringe act simultaneously. Gilbert (1978) , Newbery (1980) , Ulph (1980) , and Groot, Withagen and de Zeeuw (1992 Zeeuw ( , 2003 consider the case where the cartel has a …rst mover advantage and the fringe members are followers.
In this literature …rms are assumed to choose a production path and therefore are able to commit to a production path at the initial time, they choose open-loop strategies. The alternative modelling choice is to allow the …rms to adjust their extraction rates at each moment to the level of the stock at that moment and to time, …rms choose closed-loop strategies. Commitment can be achievable for example in the presence of a perfect futures market for the resource. In other circumstances information about the resource stocks of competitors may not be available. In that case modelling each …rm's problem as a choice of an open-loop extraction strategy that maximizes its discounted pro…ts is a reasonable assumption 1 .
In the present paper we use a di¤erential game framework 2 (see Dockner et al., (2000) ) and restrict attention to the open-loop Nash equilibrium. The relationship between open-loop Nash equilibrium and feedback Nash equilibrium is studied in Benchekroun and Withagen (2008) . In particular they show that in case of a …nite number of players the two equilibria do not coincide, but that they do in the case of a price taking fringe.
The objective of this paper is threefold. We …rst characterize the open-loop Nash equilibrium in the case where there is an arbitrary number of …rms in two groups where …rms can di¤er across groups, in both their resource stocks and their constant marginal extraction costs. We thereby extend the analysis by Loury (1986) , where the players are identical with regard to extraction costs. We also extend the work by Lewis and Schmalensee (1980) by including more than one supplier in each cost category. Secondly, we derive the open-loop Nash equilibrium for the cartel-versusfringe model from the oligopoly model by considering the case of one coherent cartel and the number of fringe members going to in…nity. Thirdly, we address the order of exploitation of the resources and its welfare implications. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium might entail situations where the well known Her…ndahl rule is violated, in particular, the low cost mines are still being exploited after exhaustion of the more expensive mines. We provide a full account of the phenomenon which was …rst illustrated in an example in Lewis and Schmalensee (1980) . Moreover, we highlight a surprising implication of the ine¢ ciency of the order of use of the resources: we show that an increase in the number of high cost mines might lead to a deterioration of social welfare. This seems paradoxical because one would conjecture that increasing the number of players will bring the economy closer to perfect competition, which, in the case at hand yields the social optimum. However, here, increasing the number of high cost mines may cause a reversal of the order of the exhaustion of stocks: the be subgame perfect. It is however time-consistent: if all players follow their equilibrium strategies then at no instant of time will a given …rm want to revise its production plan. We would like to point out that the predominance of the analysis of open-loop strategies in the literature is not purely motivated by realism. One of the reasons given by Lewis and Schmalensee, who concentrate on the open loop Nash equilibrium, and not on the feedback equilibrium, is that, "The latter concept seems intractable in this model" as they note (p 477). A few exceptions are Eswaran and Lewis (1985) , Polasky (1990) and Salo and Tahvonen (2001 high cost stock is exhausted before the low cost stock. This ine¢ ciency that results from more competition due to an additional high cost …rm can outweigh the bene…t from extra competition.
In section 2 we present the model and the equilibrium concepts. In section 3
we fully characterize the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Section 4 treats the order of exploitation and the welfare consequences. Section 5 concludes.
The model
There are n(> 1) …rms and two types of mines l and h; distinguished by their marginal extraction costs. Marginal extraction costs are constant: k l and k h for the low cost and high cost mines, respectively, with k l < k h : Each …rm exploits one and only one mine. There are n l …rms that exploit the mines of type l and n h …rms that exploit the mines of type h with n l + n h = n: Firm i of type j (i = 1; 2; :::; n j ; j = l; h) is endowed with an initial stock S j 0i . Extraction rates at time t 0 are denoted by q j i (t) and are non-negative: De…ne q
as aggregate supply and initial stocks of the …rm types. Demand for the resource is stationary and linear with a choke price p : p(t) = p x(t); where p(t) is the price 3 at time t, x(t) is the quantity demanded at time t and p > k h . We work in continuous time, which starts at time 0. In an equilibrium at each moment t 0 the price of the resource is given by p(t) = p q l (t) q h (t): All agents within a group are assumed identical with regard to stocks:
h. An extraction path q j i (i = 1; 2; :::; n j ; j = l; h) is said to satisfy the resource constraint if
Firms are oligopolists in the resource market and the objective of each …rm i is to maximize the discounted sum of its pro…ts
subject to its resource constraint.
De…nition: Open-loop Nash Cournot equilibrium (OLNE)
A vector of functions q (q ii. for all i = 1; 2; :::; n
for allq l i satisfying the resource constraint iii. for all i = 1; 2; :::; n
for allq h i satisfying the resource constraint.
3 Open-loop Nash equilibrium with a …nite num-
ber of players
Each …rm i takes the supply paths of its n 1 competitors as given and maximizes (2) subject to (1) . The Hamiltonian associated with the problem of …rm i therefore reads
Among the necessary conditions we have that the co-state variable j i is constant because the Hamiltonian does not contain the resource stock. In addition the Hamiltonian is maximized with respect to the …rm's own extraction rate, at each moment in time. Writing these necessary conditions for a solution to each of the n individual …rms and using symmetry among the players within a group, i.e. q j i = q j =n j and j i = j for j = l; h and all i = 1; ::; n j ; gives the following. 
The …rst condition follows from the maximization of the Hamiltonian of player i from category l assuming an interior solution. The second condition is necessary in order for players from category h not to supply. The third condition gives the resulting market price.
Along intervals of time [t 1 ; t 2 ] with t 2 > t 1 0 where, for all t 2 [t 1 ; t 2 ]; q l i (t) = 0 for all i and q h i (t) > 0 for all i; we have
Along intervals of time [t 1 ; t 2 ] with t 2 > t 1 0 where, for all t 2 [t 1 ; t 2 ]; q l i (t) > 0 for all i and q h i (t) > 0 for all i; we have
For q l (t); q h (t) and p(t) we then obtain
By S; C l and C h we denote intervals of time with simultaneous supply, sole supply by the l type mines and sole supply by the h type mines, respectively.
At points of transition from one regime to another the price trajectory is continuous, a property that will be exploited below. This property is due to the fact that along an optimum the Hamiltonian is continuous. Continuity of the price path at the di¤erent possible transitions gives:
-a transition at t from S to C l or vice versa requires
-a transition at t from S to C h or vice versa requires
-a transition at t from C l to C h or vice versa requires
The direct procedure to solve for an OLNE is to solve the above system of necessary conditions. Given all the possible alternatives such an approach is very tedious.
Instead, we examine di¤erent sequences of phases of exploitation and rule out those that violate the above set of conditions, including continuity of the price path. This turns out to be a powerful instrument to characterize the sequence of exploitation along the equilibrium path and it greatly facilitates the characterization of the exploitation path. We establish several lemmata that are helpful in the derivation of a complete characterization of the equilibrium.
Lemma 1:
i. There cannot be a transition from C l to C h or vice versa.
ii. There exists a phase S:
iii. A phase C h cannot precede a phase S:
Proof:
i. Suppose a transition from C l to C h or vice versa takes place at time t: Then equation (17) holds. It follows from (5) and (6) that
Moreover, it follows from (8) and (9) that
Using (19) in (18) yields p k h + h e rt . Therefore
which implies a too high price to have a positive quantity demanded after the transition.
ii. This follows immediately from statement (i) of the lemma.
iii. Along C h equations (8) and (9) hold. Hence, for
A transition at t 1 from C h to S or vice versa requires (16) to hold, stated otherwise
Since
h h e rt is decreasing over time since it is a monotonic function of time and it is larger than p + n h k
It will prove useful to de…ne
Since p > k l we clearly have k l > k l . Given a cost k l the equilibrium depends on the extent of the cost disadvantage of the high cost …rms.
Lemma 2:
i. Along C l equations (5) and (6) hold. Hence for
A transition at t 1 from C l to S or vice versa requires (15) to hold, stated otherwise
rt is decreasing over time since it is a monotonic function of time and it is larger than p + n l k l n l + 1 k h before t 1 and equal to
This implies that n l + 1 h n l l < 0; which along with
then we get a contradiction in the same way.
Lemma 3:
i. There is simultaneous supply throughout if only if
there is no simultaneous supply just before total exhaustion.
Proof :
i. De…ne T as the time of exhaustion of all resources. If there is simultaneous exploitation just before T , then q l (T ) = q h (T ) = 0, and, from (12), (13) and (14),
Let the interval with simultaneous exploitation start at t 1 : Integration of (12) gives
That is
Substituting p k h = h e rT and p k l = l e rT gives after algebraic manipulation
Similarly, from 13
Setting t 1 = 0 and dividing (24) by (25) yields (23).
ii. Since p + n h k h n h + 1 k l > 0 by assumption, this is immediately clear from (24) and (25)
Lemma 4:
Consider the sequence S ! C l ; with C l the …nal phase before exhaustion and where the transition takes place at instant of time t 1 and exhaustion at T: Then
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 5:
Consider the sequence S ! C h ; with C h the …nal phase before exhaustion and with the transition taking place at instant of time t 1 and exhaustion at T: Then
Proof: Due to symmetry the proof is exactly the same as the proof of the previous lemma.
We can now exploit the lemmata above to characterize the sequence along an OLNE depending on the parameter values.
Proposition 1
Suppose
Proof:
Given the assumption on the costs, k h > k l , we cannot have C l alone or C h alone over the entire game: both types of mines eventually exploit and exhaust their stock.
According to lemma 1ii, there must be a phase S: According to lemma 3ii, the …nal phase of the exploitation cannot be S. A phase S cannot precede C l (lemma 2ii).
Therefore, the last phase of the exploitation pattern is C h : From Lemma 1i there cannot be a transition C l ! C h . Therefore, the last two phases will be S ! C h : It remains to show that the only phase that can precede S is C l . This can easily be seen from (16), that implies that there is at most one transition S ! C h or vice versa.
Since there must be one transition S ! C h , the equilibrium reads
We show next that if the initial stock S l 0 is large enough we must have a phase C l that precedes S ! C h . Suppose that the equilibrium reads S ! C h with the transition at t 1 and …nal time T: It follows from (13) that
When S l 0 becomes arbitrarily large it follows from (28) and (29) that t 1 and T also become arbitrarily large. Use h = e rT p k h and rewrite (16) to obtain
Hence, both l and h tend to zero when S 
From Proposition 1 it is clear that if the cost di¤erence is large enough, i.e. given k l > 0; k h > k l , the low cost resource is exhausted …rst regardless of the level of the stocks. However, when the cost di¤erence is not too large, i.e. given k l > 0; k h 2 k l ; k l , the order of exhaustion of the resource stocks depends on the initial stocks available.
Proposition 2
Suppose k h < k l .
i. If
then the equilibrium reads S
ii. If
then the equilibrium reads S ! C l :
From Lemma 1ii there always exists an S phase. By Lemma 2i the S phase cannot be preceded by C l and, from Lemma 1iii, the S phase cannot be preceded by C h :
Therefore, the equilibrium starts with S: Since a transition from C l to C h or vice versa is ruled out by Lemma 1i, the equilibrium reads S ! C h or S ! C l : If condition (32) is satis…ed we have simultaneous supply throughout. If conditions (28) and (29) are satis…ed with T > t 1 > 0 then we must have S ! C h : Otherwise the equilibrium reads S ! C l : If this would not hold, a contradiction is obtained as is straightforward to see
We have not yet treated the border cases where either
This is dealt with in

Proposition 3
i. Suppose k h = k l . Then the result of proposition 1 holds with C l collapsing
ii. Suppose k l = k h : Then the results of proposition 2 hold with k l = k h .
Proof:
i. If the premises of the proposition holds, lemma 1i still holds. This implies from (13) that at the beginning of the S phase q h (0) > 0; regardless of the stocks.
ii. This is evident. This case reduces exactly to the case studied in Loury (1986) These propositions fully characterize the OLNE for a …nite number of players. It can be checked that in each of the cases above we have T > t 1 :
We end this section by considering the case of an in…nite number of fringe members and a single cartel. This constitutes what is called the cartel-versus-fringe model. We assume that the cartel owns the resources that are cheap to exploit. So, n l = 1
and n h = 1: If we take the limits of the equilibrium derived under di¤erent cost constellations we arrive at
Proposition 4
If n l = 1 and if n h ! 1 the open loop Nash equilibrium has the following limits:
This is straightforward from propositions 1, 2 and 3
This outcome corresponds to the outcome of a cartel-fringe model where the fringe …rms are assumed to be price takers. See Ulph and Folie (1980) . Theoretically it cannot be excluded beforehand that the type of mine with the number of players going to in…nity is the cheaper type. According to proposition 1 (with n l = 1) the equilibrium reads C h ! S ! C l ; with the …rst phase possibly collapsing.
We conclude that not only in the case of a symmetric oligopoly but also in more general settings behaviour of large groups of similarly placed oligopolists can be rep- Suppose that initially we are in an equilibrium with only simultaneous supply, i.e., (32) holds. Written di¤erently
Let us keep the aggregate initial stocks …xed and increase the number of high cost mines. Then the right hand side of equality (35) decreases while the left hand side remains unchanged, implying that the new equilibrium becomes S ! C l : Therefore, increasing the number of high cost mines causes an ine¢ ciency. We show that this ine¢ ciency can outweigh the positive impact from having more competition in the market and therefore that having more competitors can be detrimental to social welfare. This possibility cannot be detected in models where …rms have the same costs. Indeed, Loury (1986) assumes equal extraction costs (but di¤ering reserves) and …nds that increasing the number of players in the oligopoly game increases e¢ ciency.
In order to demonstrate the possibility of decreasing social welfare we construct a simple example. Take p = 10; r = 0:1; n l = 1; k l = 0; k h = 2:5; S l 0 = 100 and S h 0 = 150. Then k h < k l , and for n h = 12 equality (35) holds. Therefore, if n h = 12 the equilibrium has simultaneous supply throughout and for n h < 12 n h > 12 the equilibrium reads S ! C h S ! C l . Let W denote social welfare de…ned as the discounted sum of consumer and producers'surplus:
which after substitution of the price gives
For the case at hand W is plotted in …gure 1 as a function of the number of high cost …rms. We observe that social welfare increases as n h increases from 1 to 2; but that it monotonically decreases thereafter. Therefore, the example shows that social welfare can decrease not only if the number of high cost …rms is increased from the level where the equilibrium is S throughout 5 (i.e., n h = 12), but also if we increase that number in part of the S ! C h regime (i.e., n h < 12). This surprising negative outcome from increased competition is due to the reversal of the Her…ndahl rule.
Increasing competition at the level of high cost mines only, exacerbates the ine¢ ciency from the order use of resources which can outweigh any gain on the consumer surplus front.
Note that changing the number of high cost …rms does not a¤ect the terminal time. This is the case since using (25) and (26) gives
The shadow price of the stock that is exhausted last doesn't change either. What does change is the date of the transition from the S phase to the monopoly phase
Some further illustrations are given in …gures 2 and 3 below, for the same parameter values as above except for S h which is now taken equal to 40. These parameter values are such that for n h = 1 we are in S throughout and thus for all n h > 1 we are For this latter case, …gure 2 displays the two price paths corresponding to n h = 1 and n h = 2: The initial price at n h = 2 is lower compared to n h = 1; re ‡ecting increased competition. However the equilibrium price path under n h = 2 eventually passes above the price path under n h = 1. Thus, consumer surplus for n h = 2 is initially larger than for n h = 1 but eventually falls below it. The di¤erence between instantaneous social welfare for n h = 2 and for n h = 1 is depicted in …gure 3. We observe that instantaneous social welfare does not decrease uniformly. The example shows that initially and eventually instantaneous welfare is smaller for n h = 2; but there is an intermediate period of time where instantaneous social welfare for n h = 2 is larger than for n h = 1.
The intuition of this result is that the increase of the number of high cost …rms creates more competition in the market and leads the …rm that owns the low cost mine to reallocate its production through time: extract less initially and more later (see …gure 4). Thus the increase of the number of high cost …rms, although it increases consumption in the short-run (see …gure 5), results in a larger share of consumption coming from high cost mines which in itself is a source of welfare loss. The example shows that, even in the short-run, this welfare loss, can outweigh the gain in consumer surplus enjoyed through larger production and a lower price. The calculations performed here have been done for other parameter sets as well.
Qualitatively the results are una¤ected.
Conclusions
We 
